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THE INVESTMENT DECISION IN THE
CENTRAL CITY: A CONSIDERATION OF A
PROPERTY TAX ABATEMENT LAW
Dipak K. Gupta*
Louis M. Rea**
I.

Introduction

Dilapidated and deteriorated housing in the large central cities of
this country continues to be a largely unresolved social problem.
Research conducted at the MIT-Harvard Joint Center for Urban
Studies demonstrated that 6.9 million households suffered as a result of the physical inadequacy of their units in 1970 and 6.2 million
more households were burdened either by the excessive cost or by
the inadequate size of the unit, yielding a total of .13.1 million
"housing-poor" households. The patterns of deprivation vary a
great deal across the country. Some difficulties, such as inadequate
plumbing, are serious in some areas, insignificant in others. Other
difficulties, such as excessive rent burdens, are found everywhere.'
The removal of the worst units from the housing stock has sometimes been the result of conscious public policy. However, much of
the loss of substandard and even standard housing in the central
cities has been the result of large scale abandonment of rental housing by its owners.
Many square miles .of our cities consist of old neighborhoods
where population decline appears imminent or has already begun.
These are the "gray areas" of obsolescent housing destined to be
vacated at an increasing rate in the near future. These declining
neighborhoods are not slums and still are largely occupied by
whites. The general neighborhood situation is so unattractive, however, that property owners feel that expense for maintenance is too
risky and, by withholding their efforts, contribute to the increasing
unattractiveness of the area.' Two alternatives are available for
Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Public Administration, San Diego State University.
Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Urban Planning, San Diego State University.
1. The results of this housing research, conducted at the MIT-Harvard Joint Center for
Urban Studies, is reported in D. Birch et at., America's Housing Needs: 1970 to 1980 in L.
LOEWENSTEIN, URBAN STUDIES 328 (2d ed. 1977).
2. The "gray area" concept and the issue of declining, older neighborhoods within metropolitan areas are pursued in B. J. FRIEDEN, THE FUTURE OF OLD NEIGHBORHOODS: REBUILDING
*

**
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dealing with "gray areas." Large scale abandonment can be accepted and solutions for large scale rebuilding can be sought; or, a
means can be sought to foster renewal of existing structures within
the context of the traditional neighborhood. This Article pursues
the latter alternative.
In such an environment, landlords and homeowners find that
rents for lower quality housing located in the most unattractive
parts of the city are often insufficient to offset rising taxes, high
insurance premiums, interest payments, and maintenance cost.
Low income tenants, who already pay high proportions of their incomes in rent, cannot readily afford raises in their rent and landlords cannot count on such rent increases as a source of revenue to
offset their rising expenditures. These considerations imply that the
rate of return on investment in the depressed communities is not
high enough relative to investment opportunities in other parts of
the metropolitan area to provide a sufficient incentive for marginal
improvements in the central city housing supply.
Many proposals have been put forth and implemented in an attempt to stem the tide of central city decay, but none has met with
any particular success. Direct forms of subsidy, such as urban renewal' and low interest home loans,' have been utilized as well as
more indirect policies. One such indirect policy has been a property
tax abatement program which attempts to encourage investment for
improvements of central city dwelling units. The potential success
of such a program has never been unresolved nor have the conditions
and circumstances underlying the successful implementation of
such a program been documented.
Accordingly, the purpose of this Article is to develop an investment decision model for analyzing the efficacy of a property tax
abatement program as an incentive for investment in the depressed
residential communities of the central city. In order to understand
the motivation of municipalities to try tax abatement as a possible
means to stem the tide of central city decay, it is first necessary to
1-11 (1964); see also D. NErZER, ECONOMICS AND URBAN PROBLEMS:
45-46 (1970).
3. For an interesting discussion of the failure of urban renewal to adequately rehabilitate
the housing stock of the central cities, see J.P. FRIED, HOUSING CRISIS U.S.A. 86-94 (1971).
4. Low interest home loans were provided largely through the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). The loans, however, have historically been given to residents of single family
homes in suburban locations. Consequently, the program has not had any significant impact
on the provision or rehabilitation of central city housing. See id. at 65-71.
FOR A CHANGING POPULATION

DIAGNOSES AND PRESCRIPIiONS
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review the advantages and disadvantages of the property tax within
the context of municipal finance. Second, it is important to place
the abatement issue into some meaningful perspective by presenting some traditional mechanisms utilized by municipalities for
property tax relief. Then, an ongoing tax abatement program in,the
city of Pittsburgh is described and analyzed within the framework
of the investment decision model. Based upon the requirements of
the model and the experience of the Pittsburgh Program, policy
implications are presented and general recommendations for any
municipality considering the enactment of such a program are offered.
This Article is intended to benefit attorneys and municipal officials who wish to enhance their understanding of the economic impacts of the property tax on the condition of central city housing.
The city planners and city administrators are provided with a decision criterion for judging the prudence of adopting a tax abatement
program or for improving upon an existing program in their own
municipality. The urban lawyer is offered an opportunity to remain
current concerning the general issue of property tax relief and the
efficacy of a particular mechanism through which such relief may
be available-tax abatement. Because this Article reviews a large
cross-section of literature, any professional urbanist will find it a
useful starting point for further research into a variety of issues
related to public finance.
II.

The Property Tax: Some Background Considerations

Government levies have never been popular in human history.
The property tax, however, has gained distinction as the most disliked of all taxes and, as a result, it has been labeled the "last fair"
tax.5 A survey conducted in 1972 for the United States Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations documented this unpopularity in the following manner:6
5.

See Raphaelson, Property Assessment and Tax Administration in J.R.

ARONSON

& E.

SCHWARTZ, MANAGEMENT POLICIES IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 110-22 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Raphaelson]. For a detailed criticism of the property tax, see A. LYNN, JR., THE
PROPERTY TAX AND ITS ADMINISTRATION (1969); TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, THE PROPERTY TAX:
PROBLEMS AND POTENTIALS (1967); see also G. BENSON, S. BENSON, H. MCCLELLAND & P.
THOMPSON, THE AMERICAN PROPERTY TAX: ITS HISTORY, ADMINISTRATION AND ECONOMIC IMPACT
(1965) (hereinafter cited as BENSON].
6. UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, PUBLIC OPINION
AND TAXES

1-2 (1972).

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. VII

Because the property tax is levied and administered by myriad local government units, one might have expected public attitudes toward this tax to show
a high degree of variation. This was not the case. Indeed, opposition to the
local property tax was uniform among respondents of various socioeconomic
backgrounds. Regardless of age, income, area of residence, type of employment, race and other such factors, each subclassification voted the property
tax as being the least fair-and generally by margins of 2 to 1.

The survey also revealed, quite predictably, that the majority of
respondents favored the replacement of the property tax with a
federal value added tax (i.e., a tax on the difference between the
receipts from the sales of a firm's product and the sum of the
amounts paid by the firm for produced goods purchased during the
accounting period) or an increased personal income tax.'
The most recent example of popular dissatisfaction with the property tax is, of course, the overwhelming support for Proposition 13
in California. Californians voted to decrease their property tax burden, which has been increasing at a tremendous rate in the past
several years. This large scale property tax revolt is beginning to
gain support in other states as well.
Although many grounds can be cited for this popular dissatisfaction with the property tax, two issues are particularly important for
understanding the impacts of property tax abatement programs.
One issue is the often unfair and discriminatory assessment practices and the other is the regressivity of the property tax structure.
Assessment of property values is a judgmental process.' The aim
of assessment is to make the assessed value as close as possible to
the market value of the property. However, if the property has not
been sold in the recent past, its market value must be estimated.
This practice leads to the strong possibility of favoritism, corrup7. Id.
8. In order to reduce the subjectivity of assessment practices, a number of municipalities
have experimented with multiple regression analysis. For example, one commentator reports
that
a pilot project in Sacramento County, California, isolated the quantifiable variables
of statistical significance and, using ten to thirty variables, established formulas that
yielded reliable estimates of selling prices, using different equations for different neighborhoods. The estimated selling prices for the parcels sold in a neighborhood differed
from the actual sale price by an average of plus or minus 5.26 percent.
Raphaelson, supra note 5, at 115. However, as Raphaelson points out, the use of multiple
regression does not replace the assessor or his subjective judgment; it only reduces the disparity. For a more detailed discussion of the issues involved, see Givartney, A Computerized
Assessment Programin D. M. HOLLAND, THE ASSESSMENT OF LAND VALUE 125 (1970); Downing,
Estimating Residential Land Value by MultivariateAnalysis in id. at 101.
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tion, carelessness and often discrimination. During the last decade,
several empirical studies of real property tax assessments have revealed an alarming pattern of discrimination against blacks and/or
low income residents in several U.S. cities?
The second criticism of the property tax is that it is extremely
regressive. That is, the burden of the tax rests more heavily on the
poor than on the rich, especially in the short run." This view stems
9. Clement, Discriminationin Real Property Tax Assessment: A Litigation Strategy for
Pennsylvania, 36 U. PriT. L. REV. 285 (1974); Statement of Ralph Nader and Jonathan Rowe
before the Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, May 9, 1972; W.J. BEERMAN, THE PROPERTY TAX AND THE SPATIAL PATTERN OF GROWTH WITHIN URBAN AREAS (Research
Monograph 16, 1969); ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., A STUDY OF PROPERTY TAXES AND URBAN BLIGHT
(U.S. DEP'T OF HoUS. AND URB. DEV. 1973) (2 vols.) [hereinafter cited as LrrrLz STUDY];
Black, The Nature and Extent of Effective Property Tax Rate Variation Within the City of
Boston, 25 NAT'L TAX J. 203 (1972); Oldman & Aron, Assessment-Sales Ratio Under the
Boston Property Tax, 18 NAT'L TAX J. 36 (1965); T. SMITH, REAL PROPERTY TAXATION AND THE
URBAN CENTER: A CASE STUDY OF HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT (1972); CONNEcTICrr CITIZEN RESEARCH GROUP, STUDY OF TAX ASSESSMENT IN NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT (1973); ERIE COUNTY
PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS IN THE CITY OF BUFFALO: A STUDY OF THE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION (1973); Behrens, Property Tax

Inequities and Other Differences in a New Scene, presented at the Conference of the National
Tax Association-Tax Institute of America, October 14, 1974; F. JAMES, AN EMPIRICAL AND
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF MEASURES OF THE UNIFORMITY OF THE PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS UNDER

THE PROPERTY TAX (1973); Report of the Atlanta Urban League on the Fulton County Property

Tax (Sept. 1974);

COLORADO PROJECT -

PROPERTY TAX (1972);

G.

COMMON CAUSE, THE UNFAIRNESS OF THE RESIDENTIAL

PETERSON, ASSESSMENT/SALES

RATIO STUDY FOR CLAIBORNE COUNTY,

MISSISSIPPI (1972).
10. There are several economists who have argued that the long run impact of the property
tax may be progressive. Harold Groves argues that "regressivity is hardly the most impressive
charge that can be laid against the property tax." He further adds: "At any one time there
are many people over-housed and under-housed, so to speak, because they have not yet
adjusted their housing expenses to their incomes, up or down. The new evidence poses the
possibility that for income classes of lifetime income, differences in burden over most of the
income scale may pretty well average out." Groves, Property Tax-Effects and Limitations

in

TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, THE PROPERTY TAX: PROBLEMS AND POTENTIALS

56-57 (1967). In

support of this hypothesis Dick Netzer noted that "considered in aggregate ... the tax has
positive advantages on distributional "and efficiency grounds." He further explained that the
property tax contains a high degree of vertical equity, in that it redistributes income from
the rich to the poor. The vertical equity occurs
because the tax itself is more or less proportional in its incidence among income groups,
but the expenditures it finances are heavily "pro-poor" in their incidence. The property tax in the aggregate also tends to increase the application of resources to high
return human investment and may deter somewhat lower return investment in physical capital.
D. NETZER, ECONOMICS OF THE PROPERTY TAX 164-65 (1966).
However, in the short run, both Groves and Netzer agree upon the regressivity of the
property tax. For an excellent and concise discussion of the subject see Note, Property Tax
Relief: A Viable Adjunct to Housing Policy?, 1972 URB. L. ANN. 171.
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from the fact that the property tax on buildings, on building improvements, and on land is largely passed on or shifted to the final
consumer of the services of the property. Specifically, renters bear
the tax on residential buildings through higher rents, consumers
ultimately pay the tax on commercial and industrial properties in
the form of higher prices for the goods they buy, and homeowners
(as opposed to the. developers and landlords) bear the tax in high
mortgage payments." Netzer argues that the property tax is analogous to a consumption tax on shelter. "Viewed as an excise tax and
leaving aside all benefit considerations, [the property tax on housing] is higher in rate than any other generally used American consumption tax, except taxes on liquor, tobacco, and gasoline."'"
Low income families spend a large share of their income on consumption of essential items such as food and shelter. Consequently,
the property tax is inherently structured to impact the low income
budget most severely. In 1968, the Kaiser Report showed that property taxes account for "26 percent of monthly shelter costs in moderately priced family housing."' 3 This evidence prompts Netzer to
conclude that the property tax discourages consumption of housing
especially in the central city."
One of the major problems with the property tax is that it penalizes those who improve the condition of their dwelling. This, indeed,
is an unfortunate feature of the tax since an investment in home
improvement not only enhances the quality of the individual dwelling unit but also enhances the general desirability of the neighborhood, thereby increasing property values throughout the neighborhood. Thus, investments for home improvement should be rewarded
11. The empirical studies generally support the hypothesis that the amount of forward
shifting of the property tax depends upon the elasticity of demandfor housing. See Orr, The
Incidence of Differential PropertyTaxes on UrbanHousing, 21 NAT'L TAX J. 253 (1968); Orr,
The Incidence of Differential Property Taxes on Urban Housing: A Response, 23 NAT'L TAX
J. 99 (1970); Orr, The Incidence of Differential Property Taxes on Urban Housing: A Reply,
25 NAT'L TAX J. 217 (1972); Black, The Nature and Extent of Effective Property Tax Rate
Variation Within the City of Boston, 25 NAT'L TAX J. 203 (1970); Coen & Powell, Theory and
Measurement of the Incidence of Differential Property Taxes on Rental Housing, 25 NAT'L
TAX J. 211 (1972); Hyman & Pasour, Property Tax Differential and Residential Rents in
North Carolina,26 NAT'L TAX J. 303 (1973); Netzer, The Incidence of Property Tax Revisited,
26 NAT'L TAX J. 515 (1973).
12. D. NETZER, IMPACT OF THE PROPERTY TAX: ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR URBAN
PROBLEMS 16 (National Comm'n on Urban Problems Report to Joint Economic Comm'n)
(Joint Commission Print 1968).
13. PRsmENTr's COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HOME 99 (1968).
14. Netzer, supra note 12, at 75.
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rather than discouraged by the imposition of a higher tax liability.
Dennis L. Wittman in his article, Property Tax Relief: A Viable
Adjunct to Housing Policy?, argues that'
[a high property tax] translates into discouraging those families financially
able to choose their home location from selecting a central city site, thereby
hastening the middle-class flight to the suburbs and more effectively isolating the poor. It also dampens the interest that many property owners might
otherwise have in improving, modernizing, or rehabilitating their central city
property, since, in many cities, such activities will lead to some increase in
assessments. For the poor, there is little that can be foregone in order to
spend more on rent, so that whatever rehabilitated housing there might be
is effectively beyond their reach. Those few low-income families that own a
home in the inner city often are forced to let their property become dilapidated.

Based upon this review, it can be concluded that the property tax
acts as a disincentive to home improvement in particular and to
investment in the housing market in general. These impacts are
particularly burdensome to low income residents who occupy central city dwellings. Despite these negative consequences of the property tax, its importance in generating desperately needed revenue
for municipalities should not be overlooked. Thus, it is appropriate
at this point to stress the local dependency upon this source of
revenue.
The property tax in the United States originated as a local tax"
and, despite its unpopularity, it has come to be the main source of
tax revenue for local governments. 7 As a source of revenue, the
15. Note, Property Tax Relief: A Viable Adjunct to Housing Policy?, 1972 URs. L. ANN.
171, 179-80.
16. Originally many states assumed the role of administering property taxes, fearing that
the local political influence would make proper assessments of wealthy property owners with
political ties impossible. Slowly they delegated it to the local authorities. Thus, before 1910,
the state of California used to assess and collect the property tax. By the 1930s the fiscal
division of revenue sources was completed and the main revenue generators for federal, state
and local governments became income, sales and property taxes, respectively. For a history
of the property taxes, see BENSON, supra note 5. See also D. NErZER, ECONOMICS OP THE
PROPERTY TAX (1966).
17. The last three decades have shown a decline in the importance of the property tax as
a percentage of total local government revenue. While in 1950, the property tax accounted
for about 43% of the total local government revenue, in 1976, the comparable figure was
approximately 31%. This decline in percentage has resulted from an increased dependence
upon federal subsidies, grants, and transfers. However, the percentage of the property tax to
the tax revenue still remains extremely high, around 80%, as a nationwide average. U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GOVERNMENT FINANCES (1976-77). The passage of Proposition 13 in
California and similar tax cut proposals in other states is sure to expedite this declining trend.
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property tax is most important for school districts (close to 98 percent of total tax revenue), followed by townships (about 90 percent)
and counties (86 percent).' 8
This overwhelming dependency by local governments upon property tax revenue can be explained within the framework of the following rationale. First, the property tax has proven to be an extremely good revenue raiser. Only federal personal income and payroll taxes generate more money.'" Second, unlike many other revenue sources, property tax receipts are extremely stable. This stability allows local governments to plan their expenditures well in advance. Third, tax avoidance is extremely difficult. Unlike intangible
or other forms of personal properties, real property is immobile and
extremely difficult to conceal. Finally, since the provision of local
public services enhances the desirability of a community, property
values will tend to rise. The resulting higher tax revenues to some
extent tend to represent a charge to those who benefit from these
services.
These factors go far in explaining why local governments have
been reluctant to tamper with their most vital source of revenue.
Attempts to alleviate the impact of the property tax on city dwellers
has met with serious revenue losses. For example, the New York
City tax exemption in the 1920s resulted in the loss of $191,387,000
of potential revenue.10
The evaluation of any property tax abatement program must be
conducted within the context of the two countervailing forces presented in the foregoing discussion. To recapitulate, although the
property tax is a major source of revenue and not easily forsaken in
the absence of viable alternatives, it has severe adverse effects on
capital investment decisions in the urban housing market. The success of a tax abatement program will lie in the ability of the local
government to sustain short term revenue losses while promoting
incentives for long term capital improvement.
18. Id. The share of the property tax to total tax revenue was, of course, much lower
(around 60%) for those municipalities which could raise property tax revenues from commercial bases such as large shopping centers. Note that the total tax revenue includes such items
as the sales tax, local income taxes, hotel taxes, etc.
19. See R. D. REISCHAUSER, R. W. HARTMAN & D. S. SULLIVAN, REFORMING SCHOOL FINANCE
24 (1973).
20. M. WALKER, URBAN BLIGHT AND SLUMS: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL FACTORS IN THEIR ORIGIN,
REHABILITATION, AND PREVENTION 287 (1938).
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III. Property Tax Relief: The Abatement Issue
In order to assess the desirability of a property tax exemption on
building improvements, it is necessary to explain the potential significance of such exemptions to landlords and homeowners. Traditional theory contends that a landlord can change the value and rent
levels of his. building by "moving" it to a different level of quality.
That is, a landlord will increase expenditures for maintenance and
capital improvement only if it can be justified by the increase in
rents made possible by such expenditures. The expected return after
the property tax must exceed the cost of capital. It is worthwhile for
the landlord to continue expenditures for improvements as long as
the cost of each marginal improvement induces enough of a rise in
rents after the property tax to match the opportunity cost of capital.
If a landlord wishes to calculate the potential long-term profitability of a tax exemption on propertyimprovement, he would probably assume that his assessment would be increased by the amount
of his improvement expenditure, which should approximate the increase in the value of the building. If the building is not reassessed
pursuant to the improvement, the annual savings to the landlord
would equal the tax rate times the increase in value, adjusted for
the local assessment ratio (the proportion of the fair market value
upon which the property tax is based). If the building owner finds
that as a result of the reassessment deferment (tax liability on a
housing improvement that is exempted) on an improvement that
the aftertax return will increase (e.g., higher rents), then the additional improvement that would otherwise be unprofitable may become profitable."
For low income housing in the central city, it is not likely that the
benefits of a property tax abatement on improvements would develop in the manner implied by the preceding theoretical discussion.
In blighted areas, a tax exemption would not do very much to upgrade the existing housing stock. Unless a landlord can expect an
actual increase in rent to offset his rehabilitation expenditures, he
will not rehabilitate. The crucial fact is that poverty area landlords
are afraid to raise rents and thus cannot profitably rehabilitate. A
reassessment deferment by itself would probably be an insufficient
21. J. HEILBRUN, REAL ESTATE TAXES AND URBAN HOUSING 8-36, 85-104 (1966). See also
Heilbrun, Reforming the Real Estate Tax to Encourage Housing Maintenance and Rehabilitation in A. BECKER, LAND AND BUILDING TAXES 63, 64-69 (1969).
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incentive to stimulate investment in slums. But if exemption from
existing taxes were granted, or if the reassessment deferment were
combined with other government subsidies, the tax incentive would
contribute toward making even slum housing improvement profitable.2
This conclusion is corroborated by an empirical study conducted
by Arthur D. Little, Inc.2 3 The study states that the most significant
obstacles to rehabilitation of rental properties in the central city
were Obtaining financing, the deterioration and resulting undesirability of various neighborhoods, and the inability to raise rents to
cover any proposed rehabilitation. It is concluded that a property
tax exemption scheme limited to lower income housing is unlikely
to create very many windfalls. In the absence of a wide range of
government subsidies, such new improvement rarely takes place.
Kuchling views tax abatements as just one possible means to
create a better climate for rehabilitation and provide some definite
financial incentives to rehabilitate. He further argues that tax
abatements, alone, may not provide a great incentive for the individual homeowner or landlord in low income areas, but they do
provide a substantial tax savings to the developer and commercial
property owner who is interested in new construction or rehabilitation."
Some states and municipalities have recognized the importance
of providing tax exemptions on a massive scale in order to rehabilitate blighted areas of the city. The most common vehicle for granting property tax exemptions to private housing landlords is the
urban redevelopment company. 25 Usually, the company contracts
with a state or local housing authority to establish the terms on
which the company will operate. It is then subject to initial approval
and continuing supervision by the authority. The redevelopment
company is required to formulate a complete plan for the redevelopment of a blighted area (not just one or a few dwelling units). Both
22. Alpert, Property Tax Abatement: An Incentive for Low Income Housing, 11 HAav. J.
LEGis. 1, 7 (1973).

23.

1 LrrrLE STUDY, supra note 9.

24.

R. KUCHLING, REHABILITATION-TAx ABATEMENTS AND DOWNWARD ASSESSMENTS (1974).

25.

Several states have enacted legislation employing the urban redevelopment company:

HAWAII REv. STAT. § 53-38 (1968); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 121A, § 10 (1969); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 125.912 (Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.651 (1963); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
353.110 (Vernon 1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:14D-26 (1964); N.Y. Pmv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 211
(McKinney 1962); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1728.10 (Page 1964).
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commercial and residential improvements can be involved. The tax
exemption takes the form of a broad governmental assistance program which includes land cost writedowns and use of the state's
condemnation power for assembling sites.
Proponents of the urban redevelopment companies argue that
despite these tax exemptions, the long run effect is actually to increase the municipal tax revenue." If the improvement of a large
area causes property values in surrounding areas to rise, new tax
revenue will be generated. Revenue will also increase if the redeveloped housing is upper income rather than low income housing. However, opponents of the urban redevelopment company contend that
if the ultimate impact of the tax exemptions is to improve the housing of middle income tenants at the expense of lower income tenants, then it is difficult to justify the existence of the company.27
Another 'Vehicle utilized for property tax exemptions is the limited dividend housing company. 8 Unlike the requirement of the
urban redevelopment company, these companies do not have to
redevelop an entire area and they are limited to residential construction. The limited dividend companies are also supervised by a
governmental agency and they generally qualify for the same state
and municipal subsidies as redevelopment companies. At least
three states have experimented with these companies-Delaware,
New Jersey, and New York.2
The limited dividend housing companies have also been sharply
criticized on the ground that the mere limitation of dividends which
may be paid out (6 to 8 percent of the profit on investment) is
26. For a more elaborate discussion of this effect, see Neufeld, Is Tax Exempt Propertya
Municipal Asset? 18 NAT'L TAX J. 415 (1965).
27. To insure that the urban redevelopment company improve the plight of low income

tenants, all state statutes, except Ohio's, provide that the annual dividend which the company may pay is limited to between 5 and 10 percent of the investment. It is hoped that such
a limit on the profit to be taken out would encourage lower rents and hence make the
buildings available to lower income tenants. This procedure, however, is often not adequate
to encourage the development of low income housing. See note 25 supra..
28. The limited dividend housing companies are similar to the redevelopment companies
in structure and intent, but unlike the redevelopment companies, they do not have to redevelop an entire area and are to build only housing. They are also subject to supervision by a
governmental agency and generally qualify for the same state and municipal subsidies as
redevelopment companies: condemnation for site assembly, land cost writedown, and tax
exemptions. However, the dividends of these companies permitted to be paid out to stockholders are limited to 6 to 8 percent of profit on investment. See Alpert, supra note 22, at 17.
29. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 4116 (1953); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40.55C-40, 55:16-18, 55:14E11 (1964); N.Y. Prv. Hous. FiN. LAw §§ 33, 93 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
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insufficient to insure that the tax subsidies benefit the poor and
inadequately housed. 0 For example, despite the statutory mandate
that benefits are to be provided only for families of low income, it
is apparent that New York has allowed rents higher than the poor
can afford.'
In Connecticut, Vermont, and Michigan, individual landlords are
provided a property tax abatement contingent on the requirement
that their housing is used solely for low income families. Connecticut has provided government-aided housing with an exemption
from all property taxes, not merely reassessment deferment. The
applicable statute, however, stipulates that such exemption will be
terminated at any time when the housing is not solely for low or
moderate-income persons or families.32 Vermont and Michigan have
tied eligibility for property tax abatement to the eligibility of landlords to receive federal mortgage subsidies." That is, unless the
landlord intends to construct housing for low or moderate income
families, the mortgage assistance would not be forthcoming. While
the condition tends to exclude those tenants who can afford adequate housing, it also excludes tenants whose landlords have not
3
sought federal mortgage assistance. '
Generally, the tax abatement statutes discussed above do not
encompass resident landlords and individual homeowners in low
income areas. These groups do not undertake major areawide redevelopment. They are not likely to be involved with limited dividend
housing companies. Also, they are not eligible for federal mortgage
subsidies. However, the resident landlord and single family homeowner are most likely to maintain livable dwellings in poverty areas
and deserve the reassessment deferment as much as the more heavily subsidized landlords. We will return to this issue of reassessment
deferment for single family homeowners later in this Article.
At least six states (Indiana, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Ohio,
New York, and Vermont) currently authorize tax exemptions for
building owners who do not operate under the broad government
30. See Alpert, supra note 22, at 18.
31. Some of the difficulties associated with affordable rents in New York are documented
in Quirk and Wein, Homeownershipfor the Poor: Tenant Condominiums, The Housing and
UrbanDevelopment Act of 1968, and the Rockefeller Program,54 CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1969).
32. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-215 (1971).
33. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3843 (Cum. Supp. 1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125-1415
(Supp. 1973).
34.

OP. CONN. ATr'y GEN., Conn. L.J., June 9, 1970, at 12.
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exemption systems previously discussed. Indiana has attempted to

carefully define the eligible beneficiaries of the tax exemption to
avoid the exclusion of low income residents. A tax exemption is
limited to housing with a low market value. Such housing is more
likely to be occupied by low income residents. Thus, the rehabilitation of inexpensive housing is the aim of the Indiana statute.35 Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New York require that the property improvement take place within an area declared by a government agency or the local legislature as deteriorated or ripe for redevelopment in order to qualify for tax exemption." The limitations are
likely to be insufficient to restrict benefits to low income residents
of the city. Vermont, without any major blighted urban areas, authorizes its municipalities to grant a general tax exemption. This is
an exemption for up to three years on the first $15,000 appraised
value of any newly constructed dwelling. This exemption does not
apply to those taxes on the value of the land as distinct from buildings. 3 Without more precise limitations on rentals, on income levels, or on the definition of the poverty area, higher income residents
could be the primary beneficiaries. Moreover, property owners, who
would probably have improved their property in the absence of a
property tax exemption, would obtain a windfall if their property
were declared eligible under the abatement statute.
In light of this comparison of the various forms of tax abatement
legislation, an investment decision model is developed below which
specifies the conditions under which capital investment in the housing stock is profitable. Particular attention is given to the required
investment incentives in the impoverished parts of the city.
IV. A Model of Investment Decision
In order to assess the impacts of a tax abatement program in
generating investments for housing improvement, it is important to
specify the dynamics of the investment decision.
The value of the property (V) is comprised of two factors-the
structure (Vk) and the land (VL). This dichotomy derives from the
fact that the property tax is comprised of the tax on the condition
35.

IND. ANN. STAT.

§ 6-1-10.1-1 (Bums 1972).

36. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-65 (West 1972); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 489(1)(a)
(McKinney 1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3735.67 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 4711-16
(Supp. 1973).
37. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 3836 (1970).
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of the property (Vk) as well as an exogenous assessment factor based
upon the condition of the neighborhood (VL).
Specifically, any investment made on property accrues to the
value of the structure and the value of the land is exogenous to the
investment decision." Although this distinction between land and
structure is somewhat arbitrary, it is conceptually sound and does
facilitate the analysis at hand.
The value of property can be expressed as follows:
V
where Vk
VL

=

-

(1)

Vk + VL

value of the structure, and
value of the land.

The present value3 of the structure is explained by:
Vk =

n'
1
t=l

(R
(1 +-C)
i)t

(2)

where R = cost

i = the rate of interest
t = time period

n = the expected life span of the structure.

The value of the land (VL) is dependent upon the condition of
the neighborhood and is assumed to be a function of time.'" Thus:
VL = (t)

(3)

38. An interrelationship between the neighborhood condition and the structure is, of
course, possible if the investment is quite a large one, such as a shopping center or development project. However, since this analysis is primarily concerned with those who own existing
structures (homeowners and landlords), rather than developers, the assumption is realistic.
39. The desirability of an investment is usually measured in terms of the discounted value
of the future stream of income. The rationale here is that a dollar earned today is worth more
than a dollar to be earned at some time in the future. Today's dollar can be invested now at
compound interest to be realized ten years later. The dollar to be earned ten years from now
should reflect this potential loss. Thus, in an inverse fashion, the present value of a future
stream of investment is shown as follows:
( oo )
0

++ R 1 -C 1

(1 + i)

R 2 -C 2
(1 -+i i) 2

+

..

R 10 -C 1 0
(1 +i) 10

where R is the revenue, C is the cost, i is the rate of interest, and subscripts 0 through 10
represent the years of investment. The present value criterion states that a project should be
undertaken if the sum of future returns (income) minus costs, discounted back to the present,
is positive, that is, if the present value is greater than zero. See R.A. BAUER & K.J. GERGEN,
THE STUDY OF POLICY FORMATION 87-93 (1968). E.J. MISHAN, ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL DECISIONS:
ELEMENTS OF COST-BENEFrr ANALYSIS 165-263 (1973).
40. This assumption may be justified by the fact that the present model is concerned only
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For housing units, it can be assumed that n is quite large and the
following approximation can be used for simplicity:4
Vk =

R-C
i

as n ->-

(4)
o

Housing production is a function of capital investment. Thus:
q = f(x)
where q = housing production
x = capital investment.

The revenue from an investment in real estate consists of three
factors. Two of these are tangible and one is intangible: (1) rents;
(2) equity accrued from the appreciation of the property; and (3)
psychic benefits derived from living in an improved dwelling unit.
The revenue generating capability of a property is a direct function
of capital investment (x), subject to a diminishing rate of return."2
with the renovation of already existing housing and not with the construction of new units.
Also, since the distinction between land and structure is conceptual, that portion of land
value, which is a function of investment (rather than a function of time) can be combined
with the investment in the structure.
. 41. See Barley & May, The Effects of Property Taxes on the Constructionand Demolition
of Houses in Urban Areas, in EcONoMic GEOGRAPHY 304 (1976).
42. The process of differentiation can be explained as a change in one variable as a result
of a change in another. Thus, a small change in revenue resulting from a change in capital
writ"
8Rchange

investment can be written as-

which means

in revenue

change in reveue
Now, if the
6X
change in capital investment.Noith
above ratio is positive (greater than zero), it is inferred that an investment in the improvement of the housing stock will bring about an increase in revenue, since improved housing
conditions will bring higher rents and will ensure a higher resale value of the property.
However, the law of diminishing returns reminds us that there is a limit beyond which
revenue cannot be raised as a result of further capital investment. That is, over time, the
revenue will fail to respond to any more investment. With the marginal revenue (an additional dollar of revenue resulting from an additional dollar of capital investment) turning
negative, the situation signifies a case of over-investment. This over-investment is expressed
by setting the second derivative less than zero. In mathematical terms, this can be expressed
as
82R
8x2
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(5)

R -- g(q)

SR_> 0

ax
8 2-R
5 X2-

< 0

The cost to the investor can be expressed as a combination of four
separate factors: (1) interest payments which are a direct function
of the capital investment; (2) the tax on the structure; (3) the tax
on the land; and (4) the cost of maintenance and rehabilitation.
Thus, the cost function can be written as:
C = ix +XV

k

+XaY

L

(6)

+ M

where A = the tax rate
M = the cost of maintenance, which is a function of time. Thus,

(7)

m
and
M r(t)
at a different rate than the structure.
1 if land is taxed <+0
a
By substituting (3), (4) and (7) into (6), we obtain:

--- x

RC
. )i
+
1

where 0

+l

(9)

(t) +m(t)]

1+

-7
X
0

1

Profit on investment is expressed as the difference between revenue and cost:
or,
I= f()-

Since the magnitude of

[ix + OR -{-aoI(t) +t m (t)]

1

(10)

is likely to be substantially less than i, it can be

assumed that:
1

17

This assumption is one of convenience and can be justified for the
most deteriorated parts of the city in the following manner. First,
from

whichvent would vary
the market rate of interest for home
about 8-9 percent to 12-13 percent depending upon the credibility
of the borrower and the location of the project. The less desirable
the location, the higher will be the rate of interest. Second, since the
rate of interest (i) also reflects opportunity costs, it should also
incorporate the various factors of risk to the investors. Because the
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market rate of interest cannot be considered uniform throughout the
entire city, the value of 1/1+0 must also vary with location. Stegman argues that investors demand the strong possibility of a return
on their inner city housing investments of around 25 percent before
they will commit their resources. This figure reflects an opportunity
cost comprised of several factors. There are few opportunities for
appreciation and capital gains; consequently, tax savings from deducting this disincentive are the risks and uncertainties of maintaining positive cash flows over extended periods; the high level of
management skills required for satisfactory performance, and the
hostile environment of the inner city market. 3 Hence, assuming
that the effective tax rate ranges between 2 and 3 percent" and the
rate of interest ranges between 8 and 23 percent over the entire
metropolitan area, the value of 1/11+0 varies widely between .93
and .73. The ratio declines with the increasing desirability of the
neighborhood and this reduces the effective cost functions for those
areas. Conversely, this ratio will approach 1 in the less desirable
section of the city.
The first order profit maximization condition states that: 5
87' = R' [f'(x)] - i 0 R'[f'(x)] = 0
(11)
ax
Rewriting (11) yields:
R' [f'(x)]

=

i + OR' [f'(x)]

or,
R' [f'(x)] = i

-

43. M. STEGMAN, HOUSING INVESTMENT IN THE INNER
STUDY OF BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 1968-70 at 95-96 (1972).
44. D. NETZER, ECONOMICS AND URBAN PROBLEMS 248

R'[f'(x)]

CITY:

(12)

THE DYNAMics OF DECLINE; A

(1974).

45. The maximization principle states that the first derivative be equal to zero. To describe this concept, imagine a horseshoe-like curve which rises to a peak and then falls. This
curve represents a profit curve. The rising slope of the peak will be positive up to the point
of the summit. At the summit, the point of maximum profit, the slope will cease to rise and
will become zero (parallel to the base). After the point of summit, the slope will be negative.
Hence, mathematically, the point of maximum profit occurs when the slope of the profit curve
is equal to zero. This can be written as:
change in profit
change in capital investment

0.

Thus, the mathematical solution at that point can be derived by taking the first derivative
of the profit function with respect to capital investment. The solving of this equation would
tell us exactly what amount of investment will maximize our profit.
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That is, the condition for profit maximization will be satisfied when
the marginal rate of return on investment (R' [f'(x)]) is equal to
the market rate of interest (i) plus an added tax on increased revenue deflated by the market rate of interest ( 4 R' [f'(x)]).
1

R' [f(x)]
Under the tax abatement program, the term 4
1
becomes equal to zero, since the tax ( X) on increased revenue resulting from increased capital investment is abolished. Thus,
equation (12) is reduced to:
(13)
R' [f'(x)] = i
Hence, equation (13) implies that it will be profitable to invest if
the marginal rate of return on investment for home improvement
is equal to or greater than the market rate of interest (i). Thus, the
condition for profitable investment can be written as:
R'[f'(x)] > i
or,
R'[f'(x)] - i > 0
or,
(14)
R'[f°(x)]- i
0
On the other hand, if the marginal rate of return on investment
is greater than the market rate of interest plus the tax on added
revenue deflated by the rate of interest, the implementation of the
tax abatement program will amount to a windfall to the investors.
This occurs because the rate of return is already high enough to
motivate investment which would be made without the incentive
program. Thus, for an abatement program to be truly successful in
influencing the investment decision, the difference between the
marginal rate of return on investment and the market rate of interest should be no longer than the amount of tax exemption
(xR'[f'(x)]) deflated by the market rate of interest (i). Mathematically this condition can be written as:
(15)
Thus, combining (14) and (15), we obtain the conditions for a successful tax abatement program:
(16)
0 eR'[f'(x)] - i -XR'[f'(x)]
R'[f'(x)] -

i

-R'[f'(x)]

Equation (16) represents an investment decision band with an
upper and lower boundary. The tax abatement program will be
successful only under the following two conditions:
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Condition 1:, If the marginal return to investment (R'[f(x)]) is
lower than the market rate of interest (i), no tax
abatement will provide any incentive and under
these circumstances, policy must be directed at improving the rates of return (e.g., direct subsidy to
I the property owner).
Condition 2: If the difference between the rate of return
(R'[f(x)]) and the market rate of interest (i) is
greater than the tax abatement deflated by the
market rate of interest (& R'[f (x)]), the tax
1

incentive program will represent a windfall for the
investors, since they would have invested without
the existence of an abatement program.4 5.1

V.

The Case of Pittsburgh

The Pittsburgh ordinance authorizing tax exemption for home
improvements was passed on November 21, 1973." In accordance
45.1.

Figure 1, on the following page, depicts these two conditions.

46.

PrITTBURGH, PA. ORDINANCE No. 596 was passed pursuant to Pennsylvania State Act
No. 34 (1971) (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 4711-101 to -103, -201 to -205, -301 to -

305 (Supp. 1978-79)).

272

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
A CROSS SECTIONAL VIEW OF THE INVESTMENT DECISION
R' f'(x)

WINDFALL
(A)

(C)

AREA OF INEFFECTUAL
INCENTIVE PROGRAM

jo

R'f (x)
FIG. I

[Vol. VII

PROPERTY TAX ABATEMENT LAW

1979]

with the Pennsylvania Statute, the council of the City of Pittsburgh
designated the entire city (Wards 1 through 32) as constituting
"deteriorated neighborhoods."47 Persons making improvements in
deteriorated residential property in the city are eligible for a tax
exemption. The goal of the ordinance was to motivate homeowners
to invest in the depressed areas of the city.
The process begins when a homeowner applies for a building permit to make improvements. At this time he is given an application
for tax exemption, which he refers to the City Treasurer's office.
Here he is interviewed to determine the nature and extent of the
proposed improvements. The Treasurer then sends a copy of the
completed application to the City Board of Property Assessments,
which conducts a reassessment of the property. If the assessment is
raised, the owner is billed for the new amount by the City, County,
and school district. The City then refunds its portion of the tax
increase.4"
A.

Participation

As of June 1977, the program had attracted only 283 applications
over a three-year period with a meager total cost of $5,665.53 in lost
revenue. Of these applications, only 14.5 percent had an upward
assessment which was related to the improvements of the properties. About six properties that had higher assessments did not qualify for exemption because it was judged that the increases were not
due to improvements. It should be noted that the Pittsburgh program applied only to individual homeowners, not to landlords owning rental property or to developers.49
B.

Statistical Analysis

The pattern of participation in this tax abatement program presents some noteworthy characteristics. First, exemptions ranged
from quite meager to fairly sizeable. In dollar terms, exemptions
ranged from $22.29 to $1,544.40 over a three-year period. The range
of the cost of improvement also varied widely from $400 to $42,500.
47. PITTSBURGH, PA. ORDINANCE No. 596, § 2 (providing for tax exemption for certain
improvements to deteriorated dwellings).
48. The process of administering the tax abatement program is paraphrased from G. E.
STODDARD, EVALUATION OF THE PITTSBURGH PROGRAM: TAX EXEMPTION FOR IMPROVED DWELLINGS

2 (1974).

49.

Although

PITTSBURGH, PA. ORDINANCE

No. 596 does not specifically restrict eligibility

to individual homeowners, the program was administered in accordance with this restriction.
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Despite the wide range of tax exemption, the ratio of the tax refund
to the cost of improvement remained extremely low. Only 18 percent
of those who qualified for an exemption through the tax abatement
program received a rebate of more than one percent of the total cost
of improvement per year.
Second, as shown in Table 1, the number of applications for property tax abatement as well as the number of persons who qualified
for the program is substantially lower in low income wards of the
city. More specifically, wards representing the central business district (1, 2, 3, and 4) have a much lower level of participation than
wards in higher income neighborhoods. In fact, in the central business district, there was only one application which also qualified for
the program in the past five years. In sum, this distribution of
application by ward shows that the tax exemptions were not distributed to the poorest parts of the city. Consequently, the Pittsburgh
experience indicates that a successful abatement program will probably have to concentrate on the "gray areas" of the city where some
short range possibility for housing improvement still exists. Refer to
Condition 1 of the investment decision model for a more technical
explanation..
Finally, on the citywide level, no evidence supports the hypothesis that the tax abatement program had any impact on the investment decision for home improvement.
TABLE 1
PARTICIPATION IN THE PITTSBURGH PROPERTY TAX
ABATEMENT PROGRAM BY INCOME AND WARD
Median
Ward Income
(1970)

Wards

No. of
Wards

No. of
Applications for
Program

No.
Qualified
for
Program

$0-3,000

1, 3, 4

3

1

1

$3,001-4,000

5, 22, 23

3

7

1

$4,001-5,000

2, 21

2

4

1

$5,001-6,000

6, 8, 12,
13, 16,
17, 25

7

49

9
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$6,001-7,000

9, 24, 26

3

18

8

$7,001-8,000

7, 10, 11,
15, 18,
27, 30

7

60

5

More than
$8,000-

14, 19,
20, 29,
28, 31,
32

7

141

16

283

41

Total

The following data were collected on an annual basis for twentythree years (1955 through 1977) to show: Building permits for (1)
extensions and additions, and (2) alterations. The estimated cost in
1967 constant dollars for each of these improvements was also obtained.
Four regression analyses were performed, each with a different
dependent variable. The dependent variables represent the building
permits granted for each type of improvement and the cost of each
type of improvement. Each regression equation has the same two
independent variables-time and a dummy variable valued as 0 for
the pre-1973 period and 1 thereafter. The purpose of the dummy
variable is to determine if there is any appreciable shift in building
permit applications or cost after the enactment of the abatement
program.
The regression results are shown in Table 2. While the number of
extensions and additions and their associated cost show a definite
negative trend over time (reflecting the overall loss of population in
the city), no significant trend in the number or cost of alterations
was found. The dummy variable is statistically insignificant in each
of the four equations. Because multicollinearity exists between the
two independent variables (correlation coefficient of .73), a second
set of regression equations was run on the first difference.5" The
50.

The first difference in a regression equation Yt

a +

aTt+

a2 Dt , where Yt

is the dependent variable, Tt is the time series and Dt is the dummy variable, is
Yt --Yt_1 = ao-- aTt
+ a2 D .o
alTt_ - a2Dt-, , whichis
equal to AY

a, ATt +

a 2 ADt . Since ATt is a vector of 1, the trend coefficient is

estimated by the intercept term.
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results are shown in Table 3 and they confirm the conclusions drawn
from Table 2. Therefore, the introduction of the tax abatement
program did not have any statistically significant impact upon the
aggregate investment decisions for home improvement in the city of
Pittsburgh. In other words, the taxpayers were subsidized for doing
what they would have done anyway.
TABLE 2
REGRESSION RESULTS
Independent Variables
Dependent
Variable

Intercept

Time

Dummy

R2

525.155
t= (30.36)*

-19.94
(12.51)*

126.50
(.94)

.904

2487.41
(8.28)*

40.41
(1.50)

-313.36

# Alterations
$ Invested in
Extensions

905.46
(5.12)*

181960
(1.12)

-5004
(2.12)

$ Invested in
Alterations

495.06
(5.01):

298785

324599

# Additions

(3.28)*

94.63* (2,20)
1.20

(2,20)

2.67

(2,20)

12.15'

(2,20)

(.68)

(.22)

.21
.55

"Significant at .01 level.

TABLE 3
REGRESSION ON FIRST DIFFERENCE
Independent Variables
Dependent
Variable

Time

Dummy

# of Extensions

-13.14

36.14
(1.15)

1.33 (1,20)

# of Alterations

45.67
(.32)

-375.67

.307 (1,20)

$ Invested in
Extensions

29.3524
(.23)

-1170
(2.02)

4.099*
(1,20)

$ Invested in
Alterations

346.27

-2816
(1.01)

1.04 (1,20)

*'Significant at .01 level.

(.57)

(.55)
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The Pittsburgh program can be summarized in the following
manner. First, the amount of tax incentive is rather small both in
absolute and relative terms (as a ratio of the exempted amount to
the cost of improvements). Second, the subsidies were not distributed to the most depressed parts of the city. Third, no aggregate
shift in the rate at which homeowners improved their properties
occurred after the introduction of the tax abatement program.
C.

Policy Implications

From this review of Pittsburgh's experience with its tax abatement program, it is clear that the program has failed to achieve its
desired goal. These failures can be explained in terms of the investment decision model. Since the average tax abatement in Pittsburgh made up about one percent of the annual cost of improvements, the program would serve as an incentive only if the rate of
return on investment is greater than the market rate of interest by
at least one percent. The market rate of interest tends to be much
higher than the rate of investment return in the most depressed
areas of the city;5 ' therefore, the one percent tax abatement was too
small to be effective. In terms of the investment decision model, this
situation represents a violation of Condition 1. This condition is
explained above in terms of the required relationships between the
rate of investment return and the market rate of interest.
Under the existing ordinance, the entire city of Pittsburgh was
declared "blighted." 5 2 This designation possibly made homeowners
in the windfall investment zone eligible for the tax abatement program. The rational investor would have invested in these zones
regardless of the abatement program (see Figure 1). A remedy for
this program is to identify the potential windfall areas throughout
51. Stegman demonstrated the importance of the investment return in the decision to
commit funds to property improvement. According to his example, suppose there are three
pieces of property valued at $8,000 and each yielding a gross rent of $120 per month. Assume
further that after ten years the sale prices of the properties are $11,482, $8,000, and $5,899
reflecting an annual appreciation of 40 percent, 0 percent, and a depreciation rate of 3
percent, respectively. If all three properties face the same maintenance costs, Stegman calculated that cash income would have to be increased by about 25 percent per year in the case
of the second property which value neither appreciated nor depreciated in order to bring its
returns up to the level of the first one. For the third property, which depreciated at an annual
rate of 3 percent, the compensating factor would be 40 percent. M. STEGMAN, HOUSING INVESTMENT IN THE INNER C(IY: THE DYNAMICS OF DECLINE 95-96 (1973).
52. PITTSBURGH, PA. ORDINANCE No. 596 declared Wards 1 through 32 "blighted." These
wards constitute the entire jurisdiction of the City of Pittsburgh.
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the city and then exclude them from the abatement program.5 3
There may be some political and perhaps legal complexities associated with singling out certain neighborhoods and labeling them
"blighted." The disadvantage of such an action could be a decline
in neighborhood morale and perhaps a lowering of property values
thereby exacerbating the problems of urban blight. On the other
hand, if only a few obviously wealthy neighborhoods are excluded
from the .program, this type of problem may be significantly alleviated. Implementation of this recommendation, however, to exclude wealthy neighborhoods from the tax abatement program
would help to comply with Condition 2 stipulated by the investment
decision model. Specifically, this condition states that the difference between the rate of investment return and the market rate of
interest should be less than the proportion of the tax abated.
With regard to those parts of the city where rates of return are
lower than the market rate of interest, a more direct program of
housing aid is recommended (e.g., home loans, urban homesteading, etc.). Thus, a tax abatement program would seem to be most
beneficial in those areas where the abated tax makes a crucial difference in the investment decision (e.g., "gray areas").
Although not apparent from the Pittsburgh experience, the situation may arise whereby the investment rate of return falls short of
the market rate of interest by a small amount. In this case, an
increase in the tax abatement allowance could swing the investment
decision from unfavorable to favorable. It would be helpful under
these circumstances for the County, the school district, and other
taxing jurisdictions within the metropolitan area to join with the
city in exempting their portion of the property tax as well. In Pittsburgh, as mentioned above, only the city's portion of the incremental tax on proposed improvements was exempted. In terms of Figure
1, this joint action by all the relevant taxing bodies would in effect
widen the band of successful program impact. More investors will
be induced to participate in the abatement program because the
increased tax relief will make investment profitable. However, until
the present, the county and the school boards have shown little
53. Legally, Pennsylvania Act No. 34 (1971) provides the local taxing authority the discretion to define the impoverished areas that would be eligible for tax abatement. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 72, § 4711-302 (Supp. 1978-79). It was legally permissible, then, for the Pittsburgh ordinance to exclude upper income areas from eligibility for tax exemption.
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enthusiasm in joining the program. Their reluctance to do so can
easily be understood in light of the previous discussion concerning
their strong dependency on the property tax as their major source
of revenue.
The Pittsburgh experience also suggests that a tax abatement
program should involve landlords and developers as well as individual homeowners. Since only a small proportion of dwelling units in
depressed areas across the country are owned by occupants,5 4 a tax
abatement program restricted to the homeowners, such as the one
in Pittsburgh, will fail to affect the bulk of inner city housing.
Another suggested policy measure is to publicize the availability
of the program. Presently, the program as structured and operationalized is self-defeating. As explained above, the process starts when
homeowners apply for building permits. In order for the program to
induce investment, it should be brought to public attention before
investors have decided to commit their funds to property improvement.Y Under the present system, it is not surprising that during
the five years of its existence, Pittsburgh's property tax abatement
program only included 41 cases.
This analysis suggests inhibition of an indiscriminant use of property tax abatement programs. Before the implementation of such a
program, municipalities should carefully evaluate the rates of return in various communities of the metropolitan area and the opportunity cost (market rate of interest) to determine if any tax relief
will affect the investment decision positively, and if so, determine
the necessary abatement percentage.
VI.

Conclusion

Dilapidated housing in the large central cities in this country
remains largely unresolved and the situation is steadily worsening.
There is an almost unimpeded growth of urban slum areas. An
abundant and varied literature points unanimously to the property
tax as a major contributor to this deterioration. A major conclusion
of this literature is that the property tax has an adverse impact on
54. D.
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Informal interviews with the community planners, conducted by Dr. Gupta during his

employment with the City Planning Department of Pittsburgh, revealed that the number of
.inquiries would increase significantly if the abatement program was explained at community
meetings (June 1977).
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the investment decision regarding housing renovation. That is,
investors are discouraged from improving their housing because
such renovation is likely to bring about an increase in tax liability.
The implementation of several direct and indirect policies which
have attempted to alleviate this adverse impact has not been successful. An indirect policy suggested for Pittsburgh was a property
tax abatement program. Under this program, households undertaking renovation are exempted from paying additional property tax
due to improvement for a three year period. To analyze the impact
of this tax abatement program on home improvement, an investment decision model has been developed which identifies the conditions under which tax abatement will serve to motivate investment
in the improvement of dwelling units in metropolitan areas.
The model suggests that the program will not be particularly
effective in inducing investment in the most depressed areas of the
city. That is, the tax abatement is not likely to be enough to make
up the difference where the rate of return on investment is substantially lower than the market rate of interest. This is typically the
situation in an impoverished area of the city where investment in
housing improvement is undertaken at great financial risk. Also, the
tax abatement is not a great enough incentive to motivate investors
to give up more lucrative investment opportunities in more stable
and thriving neighborhoods.
The model also suggests that if the difference between the rate of
investment return and the market rate of interest is higher than the
proportion abated, the program will amount to a windfall for investors. This situation occurs when wealthy neighborhoods are eligible
for a tax abatement program. Because the home improvement was
already a profitable investment in the absence of a tax abatement,
any further financial incentive to invest is unnecessary and is a
wasteful use of municipal revenue.
The type of neighborhood which might benefit from a tax abatement program is the "gray area" of the city. In these aging, deteriorating areas, it is unlikely that the rate of investment return is quite
close to the market rate of interest. Under these circumstances, the
abated tax on home improvement could make the investment a
profitable venture. Where the tax rate on improvement is the main
obstacle to renovation, the abatement program will transform an
unprofitable investment opportunity into a profitable one.
In light of these general conclusions, an analysis of the Pittsburgh
program yields several observations. First, Pittsburgh's tax abate-
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ment program has largely failed to induce investment in housing
renovation in the poorest sections of the city.'Second, the Program
failed to generate interest in renovation in the city generally as the
statistical analysis fails to detect any shift in renovation activities.
Third, the amount of tax abatement was extremely low, usually less
than one percent of the investment. Fourth, only the city of Pittsburgh is committed to this program. The County and other taxing
bodies have shown little interest in giving tax rebates for home
improvement, thereby making the total amount abated rather
small.
Based upon the decision model developed in this paper and the
Pittsburgh experience with tax abatement, several general recommendations can be put forth. A tax abatement program alone
should not be expected to have any positive impact on the center
city or in other depressed neighborhoods. The Program should also
exclude wealthy neighborhoods from the program to avoid investment windfalls. In order to impact the "gray areas" in any significant manner, the size of the rebate should be enlarged, possibly
both by increasing the years of exemption and by encouraging other
taxing bodies to adopt the program. In order to increase the rate of
response to the tax abatement program, landlords and developers,
who have sizeable land holdings throughout the metropolitan area,
should also be eligible for the Program.
Finally, before any city or municipality decides to embark upon
a tax abatement program, it should be fully realized that the conditions which are necessary to make the program successful are extremely stringent. There is not much evidence to demonstrate that
this form of inducement will entice large numbers of investors to
invest in home improvement. Further, given the declining property
tax revenue in many central cities, especially throughout the northeastern part of the United States, the prudence of adopting a tax
abatement program should be strictly scrutinized.*
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